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What Should Be in a Malpractice
Insurance Policy
Sidney Franklin*
T HE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE POLICY, also known as Profes-
sional Liability Policy, should precisely delineate the cover-
age, whether partnership or individual, the exact period of the
coverage, the exclusions and limitations, the type of practice, the
exact premium and the cancellation procedure. Companies gen-
erally write this insurance only upon receipt of completed appli-
cations furnishing the following information, which becomes a
part of the declarations of the policy: the name and address of
the applicant, limits of liability, licensure, partnership connec-
tions, operation of hospital, sanitarium or clinic with bed and
board facilities, performance of major surgery, use of X-ray
therapy, professional background and affiliations, specialty, rec-
ord of past claim experience, and whether similar insurance has
ever been cancelled.
Whether or not it is necessary for a physician to have paid
a loss before suit can be brought upon the policy depends on
whether it is a liability or an indemnity policy, the tendency be-
ing to construe such policies as liability contracts. Indemnitees
may recover on contract indemnifying against liability as soon
as it is fixed, though they have sustained no actual loss.'
A case where a policy insuring a surgeon against loss from
liability for malpractice, and requiring the insurer to defend, etc.,
did not use language specifically showing that no action could be
maintained thereon until the insured had paid on a judgment.
The court held that the indemnity was not limited merely to
sums paid by the surgeon so that where the surgeon became a
voluntary bankrupt after a rendition of judgment for malprac-
tice, the judgment constituted a loss within the terms of the
policy. The trustee in bankruptcy might therefore sue for bene-
fit of the judgment creditor, the sole creditor scheduled.2
*M.D., LL.B., M.S.P.H., F.C.L.M.; of Youngstown, Ohio. [A paper pre-
sented at the American College of Legal Medicine meeting in New York
City, June 20, 1965.]
1 Pickering v. Hartsock, 221 Mo. App. 868, 287 S.W. 819 (1926).
2 Schambs v. Fidelity Co. of New York (2 cases), 259 F. 55 (C.C.A. Ohio
1919), 170 C.CA. 55, 6 A.L.R. 1231.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
A policy insuring against loss or damages that is not avail-
able until an insured pays the loss, should be considered against
public policy.
A number of important decisions have set the standards of
professional conduct for the practice of physicians. Some leading
cases are as follows:
The physician should have and use a reasonable or or-
dihary degree of skill and learning commonly possessed by
members of his school or system in the same or similar local-
ities, plus exercise of his good judgment.3
The standard of conduct is in terms of his community
(or similar communities) at the time he practices. So far
as medical treatment is concerned, the borders of the com-
munity do in effect include those centers readily accessible
where appropriate treatment may be had, which the local
physician, because of limited facilities or training is unable
to give. 4
The medical practitioner is obliged to keep reasonably
abreast of progress in his profession and to use accepted and
recognized methods in diagnosis and treatment.5
A doctor who holds himself out as a specialist in a spe-
cific area of medical practice may be held to a somewhat
higher standard of knowledge and skill than is the general
practitioner. 6
A doctor may be liable for the conduct of nurses, X-ray
technicians and assistants in the performance of operations,
other treatment, or diagnostic procedures. The primary fac-
tor in imposing liability is the right of the doctor to control
the conduct of assistants.7
3 Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880). Stallcup v. Cos-
carart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P. 2d. 791 (1955); Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105,
111 A. 2d. 675 (1955); Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W. 2d 639
(1952); McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 399, M.D. Pa. (1947); Ayers v.
Parry, 192 F. 2d. 181, 184 (3rd Cir. 1951); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d. 749, 753,
205 P. 2d. 3, 5 (1949).
4 Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
5 Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898). Kingston v.
McGrath, 232 F. 2d. 495 (9th Cir. 1956); Corn v. Grench, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.
2d. 173 (1955); Hembree v. Von Keller, 189 Okla. 439, 119 P. 2d. 74 (1941);
Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E. 2d. 285 (1940); Gottsdanke v. Cutter
Laboratories, No. 266, 824 and Phipps v. Cutter Laboratories, No. 272, 691,
Superior Court of Cal. for Alameda County (on appeal).
6 Ayers v. Parry, 192 F. 2d. 181 (3d Cir., 1951); Scarano v. Schnoor, 158 Cal.
App. 2d. 612, 1958, 323 P. 2d. 178 (1958); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d.
307 (Fla. App., 1958), Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E. 2d. 337
(1953).
7 12 Vand. L. R. (3), 598, 604 (1959).
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The medical practitioner who has undertaken to treat
a patient cannot cease his visits except with the consent of
the patient; upon giving the patient sufficient notice so that
he may employ another doctor; or when the condition of the
patient is such as no longer to require medical treatment-
and of that condition the physician must judge at his peril.8
In professional liability policies as in other matters, court
interpretations differ widely. In states in which charitable insti-
tutions are not legally liable for their torts, most of the courts
have still refused to lift the veil of immunity even if the institu-
tions do take out liability insurance.9
It may be asked with some reason what benefit or protection
is rendered by these policies, since the insured has no legal
liability. Most of the better companies now have a provision in
their policies preventing the raising of the defense of immunity
except with the written consent of the insured, and this is usu-
ally reserved as a means of combating fraudulent claims or
malingering.
It would appear that this is a circumvention of the protec-
tion statute by the defendant and/or the company. Suggestions
have been made that the courts could easily regard the carrying
of the insurance as a waiver of judicial immunity up to the policy
limits, in states where the veil of sanctity surrounding such insti-
tutions still remains. The suggestions may serve a useful pur-
pose, but they can not be considered as having a logical legal
basis.
A policy should not include coverage prior to the date of the
endorsement period (on the theory that the insured did not know
that suit could be reasonably expected).
When a chiropractor's policy expressly limited its liability to
claims arising within two months after the termination of its
coverage, a claim arising thereafter was not covered, even
8 Becker v. Janiniski, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45, 49, 15 N.Y. Supp. 675, 676 (1891);
Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d. 257, 130 P. 2d. 341 (1942); Lawson v. Con-
away, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
9 Levy v. Superior Court of California, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 P. 1100 (1925).
Williams Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick, 223
Ky. 355, 3 S.W. 2d. 753, 62 A.L.R. 721 (1928); McKay v. Morgan Memorial
Cooperative Industries and Stores, 272 Mass. 121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930); Great-
rex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137, 86
A.L.R. 487 (1933); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126
So. 465, 67 A.L.R. 1106 (1930); McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 198 Mo. 562,
95 S.W. 2d. 917 (1936); Susman v. Y.M.C.A., 101 Wash. 487, 172 P. 554
(1918).
Sept., 1965
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
though the malpractice occurred during the policy period. 10 This
kind of limitation should be deemed against public policy.
Where a policy issued to an osteopath excluded injuries
caused while engaged in performing an unlawful act, an injury
to a patient resulting from treatment by such osteopath's un-
licensed assistant knowingly permitted by the insured, which
made both the insured and his assistant guilty of violating the
law, was not covered."
The word "malpractice" may embrace the performance of a
criminal act, such as a criminal assault, and words "error" and
"mistake" could also embrace an assault.'2
Failure to obtain a patient's consent before performing an
operation did not constitute an assault and battery within an ex-
clusionary clause when that liability was covered under a mal-
practice clause.
13
Where the contract of the physician with the patient was to
effect a cure, or guarantee a successful skin grafting operation,
a failure to perform such an operation successfully was not with-
in the terms of the policy.
14
An indemnity policy insuring an optometrist against "mal-
practice," error, or mistake in the practice of optometry only
did not cover his malpractice in doing things not covered by the
statutory definition of optometry. Removal of dirt from a pa-
tient's eyes was held not covered by such a policy.15
Policies require that insured must cooperate with the com-
pany and, upon the company's request, attend hearings and trials
and assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence,
obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits.
In one case an indemnity policy required the insurer to de-
fend suits at its own expense. It also required the insured to
attend and cooperate in the preparation and defense of suits
"without charge." The failure of a physician to make a trip from
10 Lehr v. Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich. 693, 296 N.W. 843 (1941).
11 Glesby v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d. 89, 44 P. 2d.
365 (1935).
12 Sommer v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 171 F. Supp. 84 (D.C. Mo.,
1959).
13 Shehee v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 122 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. La.,
1954).
14 McGee v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 53 F. 2d. 953 (C.C. 1st, 1932).
15 Gen. Code 1295-21. Kime v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 66 Ohio
App. 277, 33 N.E. 2d. 1008 (1941).
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Texas to Ohio at his own expense to attend the trial of a suit
against him was held not to be a breach of a condition subse-
quent where he gave notice that it was financially impossible to
do so. 16
Summary
It should be considered against public policy for a malprac-
tice insurance policy to:
1. require actual payment, that is monetary loss, by
the insured, before his insurer, that is the insurance com-
pany, becomes liable for the resulting obligation against the
insured.
2. insure in disregard of a protection statute against the
legal liability of a charitable institution, by means of a
waiver by the company of this legal protection, whether or
not conditioned upon later written release of the company
from such waiver by the insured to combat fraud and
malingering.
3. limit the duration of liability for malpractice that
occurred during the policy period, nor should the policy in-
clude coverage for malpractice that occurred before the be-
ginning of the endorsement period.
4. release an insurer from claims resulting from un-
lawful acts, such as assault and battery in operating without
permission.
5. require unreasonable assistance from insured in the
matter of cooperation and attendance at a trial where actual
hardship and financial impossibility are involved and the in-
sured gave notice thereof to the company.
There should be thorough investigation of the feasibility of
non-cancellable and group malpractice insurance, and of com-
pulsory malpractice insurance.
The preceding discussion generally applies to all professional
liability policies, including those of physicians, dentists, hospitals,
nursing homes, lawyers, accountants, chiropractors, chiropodists,
podiatrists, other medical practitioners, and druggists.
16 Medical Protective Co. v. Light, 48 Ohio App. 508, 194 N.E. 446 (1934);
7A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Secs. 4502-4507 (1942).
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